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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
BRIAN SWINK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 990501-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
CONCLUDING THAT SWINK'S STATEMENT WAS ADMISSIBLE 
ALTHOUGH IT WAS TAKEN DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF MIRANDA1 WARNINGS. 
A. Swink Was In Custody For Purposes of Miranda. 
The State argues that Appellant Brian Swink ("Swink") was 
not in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings. See State's 
Brief ("S.B.") at 9-15. The State makes this argument under the 
"added imposition" test, an analysis applied in other 
jurisdictions to Miranda issues that arise in the prison context, 
Id.; see also Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 
1978) (applying added imposition test in prison context)2. 
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1976); see also Dickerson v. United 
States, U.S. Supreme Court No. 99-5525, June 26, 2000 (affirming 
Miranda ruling). In upholding Miranda, the Dickerson Court 
reasoned, "Miranda has become embedded in routing police practice 
to the point where the warnings have become part of our national 
culture. . . . [Miranda jurisprudence] ha[s] reduced the impact 
of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement, while 
reaffirming the decisions!s core ruling that unwarned statements 
may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief." 
Id. 
Swink's opening brief and the State's brief discuss other 
cases that utilize the "added imposition" test. 
As noted in Swinkfs opening brief and in the trial court 
below, the "added imposition" test does not apply to this 
situation because Swink was not incarcerated prior to being 
interrogated by Chris Pacheco and Officer Ford at Decker Lake. 
See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 17; R.70[12]. Rather, he had 
absconded from the Genesis program several hours earlier, and was 
even left on his own recognizance for an hour and a half until 
Officer Ford picked him up at a private residence after Swink 
turned himself in. R.69[15-18,33]. Moreover, Pachecofs and 
Ford's testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the 
questioning of Swink indicate that they regarded Swink as not 
being in custody prior to bringing him back to Decker Lake. For 
example, both Pacheco and Ford testified that Swink was in state 
custody when he was interrogated, and that he had been arrested 
on the fugitive warrant that issued when he absconded from 
Genesis. R.69[21,34]. Accordingly, the "added imposition" test 
has no application under the circumstances of this case. 
Additionally, Utah case law already provides an adequate 
analysis which applies regardless of whether a defendant is in 
prison when subject to a custodial interrogation. See State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). That analysis includes 
the following four factors: "'(1) the site of the interrogation; 
(2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether 
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length 
and form of interrogation.111 Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. 
2 
earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. 
Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 715-16 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 
321, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) set forth the same 
factors and determined that no single factor was "dispositive"). 
The State asserts that the Mirauet test "is of little 
utility in a secure setting because the inmate has already been 
arrested and is in custody." S.B.10. However, such a narrow 
application of Mirquet is unwarranted. Read more practically, 
the Mirquet factors lend themselves well to an analysis of 
custody in the prison setting, and provide a cleaner and more 
workable test for Utah courts dealing with this issue in future 
cases, both at the trial level and on appeal. 
For example, "the site of the interrogation" in a prison 
goes to whether he was questioned while in his normal setting and 
routine at the prison, or whether he was sequestered in a special 
area. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. "[W]hether the investigation 
focused on the accused" as well as the "length and form of the 
questioning" go directly to the sort of questioning that occurs 
and whether it is a general inquiry or a more calculated 
investigation into suspected criminal activity of the prisoner. 
Id. ""[W]hether [] objective indicia of arrest were present" 
similarly meshes well with custody determinations in the prison 
context since it highlights if and how a prisoner is actually 
removed from his normal routine and life in the prison into a 
3 
relatively more "custodial" situation, i.e. in handcuffs, 
escorted, or merely called to report to a prison employee. Id. 
In any event, whether this Court adheres to Utah precedent 
and follows the well-suited Mirguet analysis in determining 
custody, or adopts the "added imposition" test as the trial court 
did below, the outcome is the same: Swink was in custody for 
purposes of Miranda. See A.B. 8-20 (discussing custody under 
Mirguet and, alternatively, under the "added imposition" test). 
B. Swink Was Interrogated for Purposes of Miranda. 
The State asserts that a Miranda violation did not occur 
because there was no police action involved in this case insofar 
as the questioning by Pacheco was concerned. S.B.17, n.8. The 
State goes further to claim that Swink does not "challenge any 
police action." S.B.17. The State concedes, however, that 
questioning conducted by Officer Ford "required the use of 
Miranda warnings and, hence, the responses should have been 
suppressed as they were elicited by an officer via questions that 
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." 
S.B. n.7 (citing Lavton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 
(Utah App. 1991)) . 
The State itself never challenged whether police action 
occurred at the trial level and, accordingly, it was not an issue 
below. In any event, as noted in his opening brief, Swink in 
fact notes that police action occurred. A.B. n.8. The 
4 
questioning by Pacheco amounts to police action because, as 
Pacheco testified, he is employed by the Decker Lake juvenile 
correctional facility. R.69[10]. Although a counselor, he is 
classified as a youth corrections officer with the authority to 
detain juvenile inmates. Id. As such, any information gleaned 
by him may be used against Swink in a criminal action. In fact, 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-117(3) (Supp. 1999) regarding case 
management staff at the Department of Youth Corrections provides 
for the investigatory powers of youth corrections staff: 
Case management staff shall conduct investigations and 
make reports requested by the courts to aid them in 
determining appropriate case dispositions. Case 
management staff shall also conduct investigations and 
make reports requested by the authority to aid it in 
making appropriate dispositions in cases of parole, 
revocation, and termination. 
Id. 
Accordingly, Pacheco is a government agent and interrogations 
conducted by him require the Miranda warnings. See Colorado v. 
Connelv, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986). 
Indeed, other case law discussing interrogations conducted 
by people with prison counselor positions and similar job titles 
establish that police action was involved here when Pacheco, a 
Decker Lake counselor and youth corrections officer, questioned 
Swink. In United States v. Cooper, 800 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1986), 
for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in a 
Miranda analysis of an interrogation conducted by a "Correctional 
Treatment Specialist." Id. at 413. The court never questioned 
5 
whether she was a government agent, but went straight to the 
issue of custody and interrogation, suggesting that police action 
was certainly involved. Id. at 414-15; see also United States v. 
Morales, 834 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1987) (questioning by prison 
physician analyzed for custodial interrogation aspects; no 
question as to whether government action was involved). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and the arguments set forth in 
Swink1s opening brief, Swink requests this Court to reverse the 
trial court's order denying his motion to suppress statements 
taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.3 The undisputed facts establish that Swink was 
subjected to a custodial interrogation. The undisputed facts 
likewise establish that he was not Mirandized at any point during 
the custodial interrogation. R.69[25,34]. Accordingly, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that his 
statement was admissible under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 444. 
SUBMITTED this /Tti day of July, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
3
 Swink submits on his opening brief to any arguments made 
by the State that are not specifically addressed herein. 
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